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Abstract 
Although politicization has become a key concept in European integration studies, it is still 
contested whether, when, and to what extent European issues have become politicized in 
domestic political arenas. In this article, we contribute to this discussion both in conceptual 
and empirical terms. We are using a new multi-dimensional index of politicization to 
systematically trace the development of politicization in national election campaigns in five 
West European countries (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland) from the 
1970s to 2010. Our findings provide clear evidence that Europe has indeed been politicized in 
the past decades. Moreover, we identified two different paths towards such a politicization. 
One of these paths is dominated by populist radical parties from the right, while the other path 
is shaped by the conflict between mainstream parties in government and opposition. On both 
paths, conflicts over membership play an important role and cultural-identitarian framing 
strategies are used. 
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Politicization has become a key concept in European integration studies. Since the mid-2000s, 
it has been the object of an intense and controversial scholarly debate (for reviews, see de 
Wilde, 2011; Hooghe and Marks, 2012). There seems to be general agreement “that 
something like politicization has happened since the mid-1980s” (Schmitter, 2009, p. 211f.). 
However, the assessments of this phenomenon differ widely. Most recent contributions have 
been inspired by the work of Hooghe and Marks (2009), who put the politicization concept at 
the centre of a new “postfunctionalist theory of European integration”. More specifically, 
Hooghe and Marks advance the argument that the European integration process has become 
politicized in the post-Maastricht period. As the consequence of a substantial transfer of 
political authority from member states to supranational institutions, European integration has 
become the object of intensified conflicts over national sovereignty, political identity, and 
financial redistribution. European integration, Hooghe and Marks argue, is no longer the 
exclusive domain of political elites; rather, it has become a highly controversial issue in the 
electoral arena and the protest arena. Politicization, they conclude, has far-reaching negative 
consequences for the European integration process because it is constraining political elites in 
European decision making. This argument not only takes issue with scholars who argue that 
the “giant” of European politics is “sleeping” (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004; 2007; Green-
Pedersen, 2012), it also challenges positions, which pretend that politicization is a necessary 
precondition for the advancement of the European integration process (e.g., Habermas, 2012; 
Hix, 2008). 
In our view, these controversies suffer from at least three shortcomings. First of all, 
our empirical knowledge on the level of politicization, its timing, and of its driving forces is 
still insufficient. Empirical accounts mostly focus on limited periods of time between the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, or on debates over single events, such as the 
Constitutional Treaty (e.g. Statham and Trenz, 2012; 2013). Moreover, controversies are due 
to different conceptualizations and measures of politicization (see also de Wilde, 2011; de 
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Wilde and Zürn, 2012). Finally, an interpretation of findings is hampered by the lack of 
empirical benchmarks. Even if scholars find differences in the level and scope of 
politicization of European integration, it is difficult to assess whether and how these 
differences actually matter. The interpretation of findings then often depends on the author’s 
(implicit) normative position.  
In this article, we aim to clarify some of these controversies by addressing three 
questions: (a) Has the European integration process actually been politicized in the electoral 
arena in the last four decades? (b) When did this politicization process start and what is its 
typical pattern? (c) What are the driving forces of this process in the electoral arena? We take 
an innovative stance in answering these questions in three ways. First, we propose a new 
index of politicization that takes into account its multi-dimensional character. Second, we 
analyse the scope of politicization, the framing of European issues, and the positioning of 
actors across countries over a long period of time. By using a relational content analysis, we 
present new and original data on the politicization of Europe in national election campaigns in 
five West European countries (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland) from 
1970 to 2010. Third, we provide an empirical benchmark to evaluate the degree to which the 
European integration issue has become politicized by systematically comparing politicization 
(and its sub-dimensions) across a broader set of political issues in election campaigns. 
 
Conceptualizing politicization in the European context 
In the political science literature, the concept of politicization can be found in various contexts 
and with rather different meanings. Scholars use it both to analyse the relationship of the 
political system to other societal systems (e.g. the economy) or sub-systems (e.g. the 
administrative system), and to investigate processes within the political system. In this article, 
we apply the second meaning. Following Schattschneider (1975 [1960]) our concept of 
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politicization emphasizes the importance of political conflict. For Schattschneider, political 
conflict is the key ingredient of politics. Politicization then can be defined as the “expansion 
of the scope of conflict” within the political system. Moreover,  by identifying the “intensity, 
visibility, direction and scope” of conflict as the key dimensions of politics, Schattschneider 
(1957) conceptualizes politicization as a multi-faceted process. Accordingly, we suggest 
focusing on issue salience (visibility), actor expansion (scope), and actor polarization 
(intensity and direction), as the three main conceptual dimensions of politicization. 
 All three dimensions figure prominently in the recent literature on the politicization of 
Europe (see de Wilde, 2011; de Wilde and Zürn, 2012). However, current research lacks a 
composite measure that integrates the three components. In the following, we propose an 
index that combines the three dimensions in a specific way. The construction of our index is 
based on three considerations. 
 First, we assume that only topics that are frequently raised by political actors in public 
debates can be considered politicized. If an issue is not debated in public, it can be politicized 
only to a very limited extent, if at all. We agree with Green-Pedersen (2012, p. 117) that 
salience is the most basic dimension of politicization. At the same time, we do not share 
Green-Pedersen’s narrow definition of “politicization as a matter of salience” only. While 
salience might be correlated with the scope of actors and politicization, these variables are at 
least partly independent and, as we show in the following, their values may deviate 
significantly from respective values on salience. 
Second, we assume that the expansion of the actors involved in a public debate is 
another key dimension of politicization. If only very few, and a restricted set, of (elite) actors 
participate in public debates on European integration, this would indicate that the scope of 
conflict is still limited. Considering the fact that the European integration process was 
dominated by executive elites in its formative phase, we focus on the degree to which actors 
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without any executive and governmental functions have become key actors in public debates 
over Europe.  
In this context, we can distinguish actor expansion across political arenas and within a 
given arena, such as the electoral arena. The former type, for example, refers to the visibility 
of actors from civil society in public debates (e.g. della Porta and Caiani, 2009; Koopmans, 
2010). Since empirical research by Kriesi et al. (2012) revealed that the national electoral 
arena is still the most relevant political arena to articulate political conflicts on issues related 
to “de-nationalization”, such as European integration, we focus on actor expansion within the 
electoral arena in this article. In this arena, where political parties compete for votes, 
expansion of the scope of actors means that not only party-affiliated actors in government 
address European integration but also party actors that are not represented in government (e.g. 
actors from opposition parties). However, we should keep in mind that political controversy in 
the electoral arena necessarily has an elitist bias and may not represent the full scope of 
political conflict on an issue which may include the activities of interest groups, social 
movement organizations and the wider citizenry (see, e.g., Hurrelmann, et al., forthcoming). 
A third key aspect of politicization is polarization of conflict among political actors. We 
agree with de Wilde (2011) and Hoeglinger (2012) that a highly salient public debate among a 
broad range of actors does not exploit the full potential of politicization. In addition, actors 
need to put forward differing positions, and we must find opposing camps. More precisely, we 
define polarization as the intensity of conflict related to an issue among the different actors. 
The most polarizing constellation can be found when two camps advocate completely 
opposing issue positions with about the same intensity.  
 How can we combine these dimensions in such a way that we can measure 
politicization comprehensively? In the following, we propose an index of politicization, which 
takes all three dimensions into account and relates them in a specific way. As in any index, 
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this composite measure should produce an instructive synthesis of the data on the three 
specific dimensions. As stated before, we regard salience as a necessary, although not 
sufficient, condition for politicization. Thus, we put salience at the core of our index. Salience 
cannot be substituted by the other two dimensions, i.e. by actor expansion and polarization. Its 
relation to these variables cannot be additive. At the same time, we do not propose a purely 
multiplicative combination of the three dimensions but multiply salience with the sum of actor 
expansion and polarization:1 
𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 × (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
 On the basis of this conceptualization, we can formulate a number of hypotheses on 
the politicization of European integration and its driving forces, which will be tested in the 
empirical analysis. Our general argument can be formulated as follows: 
- Politicization hypothesis: the European integration process has been politicized 
significantly in the past decades. Therefore, we expect an increase in our politicization 
index in all EU member countries (H 1). 
This general argument comprises three hypotheses on the salience of issues, the 
expansion of actors, and the polarization of actors. We formulate these hypotheses separately, 
although we assume that they must all be confirmed for the general argument to hold. 
However, our multi-dimensional conceptualization allows the possibility that the 
politicization hypothesis must be rejected, although our expectations on some of the 
individual dimensions are met. The three hypotheses are: 
                                                          
1 In contrast to a multiplicative index, the proposed index leads to a higher politicization score for a salient 
public debate, with only a few dissenting voices, as compared to a debate that gets only little attention, although 
the actors differ widely in their opinions. However, note that the most politicized constellation occurs if an issue 
is salient, and we find a polarized debate among a broad range of government and opposition parties. 
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- Visibility hypothesis: European integration has led to an increasing visibility of European 
issues in public debates and, most importantly, to increasingly salient public contestation 
among political actors (H 2). 
- Actor expansion hypothesis: European integration has expanded the scope of actors 
involved in political debates on European issues; in particular, it has reduced the 
importance of governmental actors in these debates (H 3). 
- Polarization hypothesis: European integration has replaced “elite consensus” by a strong 
polarization of actors in public debates (H 4). 
 
What are the driving forces of politicization? 
In addition to the description of the development of politicization with the help of a new 
politicization index, we aim to examine  its main driving forces in the European context. It is 
certainly beyond the scope of this article to provide a comprehensive explanation of 
politicization. Rather, we provide a first cut at this complex and unsolved question by 
focusing on key factors emphasized in the scholarly literature, in particular by Hooghe and 
Marks (2009) and by de Wilde and Zürn (2012).  
The first factor is historical events and critical thresholds in the integration process. 
According to de Wilde and Zürn (2012, p. 140), “the rising politicization of European 
integration is primarily a reaction to the increasing authority of the EU over time”. In this 
context, major integration steps, but also national decisions on EU membership, may serve as 
triggers or focal points of political controversies. Such events represent milestones in the 
transfer of political authority to supranational institutions and in the territorial expansion of 
the EU. In the course of such key events, public attention paid to European issues is 
particularly high and there is discussion of major political alternatives on the future direction 
of European integration. In the literature on European integration, there is broad agreement 
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that the Maastricht Treaty represents such a critical threshold, as it led to a strong increase in 
the level and scope of integration (e.g., Hooghe and Marks, 2009, p. 21). Of course, there are 
other critical events that may serve as foci of political contestation, such as the debate on 
British membership to the EC in the early 1970s, the controversies on EU membership in 
Switzerland, or the conflicts over Turkey’s EU membership in the mid-2000s. Statham and 
Trenz (2012), for example, argue that national debates on the Constitutional Treaty and the 
Euro crisis represent additional milestones in the politicization of the integration process. 
Applying a longer historical perspective, out data is sensitive to such critical events and 
thresholds. To sum up, we formulate an additional hypothesis on the relevance of critical 
thresholds in the integration process for its politicization: 
- Authority transfer hypothesis: The politicization of European integration is driven by 
transfers of authority from the national to the European level. Because the Maastricht 
Treaty represents a very critical event in this process, we expect a significant and lasting 
increase of politicization in the period after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (H 5). 
The second factor discussed in the scholarly literature is the role of political actors and 
their mobilization strategies. Critical events may trigger political controversies; however, 
these conflicts only become relevant if political actors and organizations articulate them in 
public debates. In the electoral arena, political parties are the most relevant actors and the key 
question then is which parties are most conducive to a politicization of the integration process. 
More precisely, we ask what kind of positional and framing strategies by political parties are 
most conducive to politicization. 
With respect to the politicization of Europe, the role of radical parties, in particular 
those on the right, is emphasized (e.g., Kriesi, 2007). According to Hooghe and Marks (2009, 
p. 14ff.), it is radical right parties which (a) emphasize European integration issues, (b) take a 
Eurosceptic or Euro-critical position, and (c) justify their criticism by referring to cultural 
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motives (e.g., the loss of national identity). Thus, by challenging the pro-European consensus 
and by framing Europe in a cultural-identitarian way, radical right-wing parties have been 
portrayed as the main drivers of the politicization of Europe. Empirical research by Kriesi et 
al. (2012; 2008) supports this claim as radical right-wing parties have been most successful in 
mobilizing on “nationalist” issues, such as immigration and European integration, in the 
electoral arena in Western Europe. Moreover, this research has shown that the restructuring of 
West European politics is the product of specific issues and thematic frames. By focusing on 
its cultural-identitarian consequences, conflicts over European integration reinforce a second, 
non-economic conflict dimension. This dimension cross-cuts the economic left-right 
dimension and introduces demands that can no longer be as easily accommodated by 
mainstream political parties. As Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue, the shift from an economic 
to a cultural or identity-related conflict might be the key factor driving the changes “from 
permissive consensus to constraining dissensus”. We can summarize these arguments in two 
hypotheses: 
- Radical right hypothesis: radical right-wing and Eurosceptic parties are the most 
important actors driving the politicization of Europe (H 6).  
- Cultural shift hypothesis: The politicization of European integration is the product of the 
increasing importance of cultural and identity-related frames (H 7). 
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Design and methods 
This article is based on original data that covers the full period from the early 1970s to the 
year 2010. This allows us to trace systematically the politicization of European integration 
since the years that Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) characterized as the period of 
“permissive consensus”. We focus on national elections as they offer “windows of 
opportunity”, where political conflict among political parties can be observed in its most 
intense form. Moreover, studying politicization in the national electoral arena sets very high 
stakes, as the European issues have to compete with other domestic political issues and events 
during the election campaign. 
The present study covers five West European countries: Austria, Britain, France, 
Germany, and Switzerland.2 In our selection strategy, we deliberately excluded East European 
countries because of their late membership to the EU. The countries selected differ with 
regard to important context factors that might shape the level and timing of politicization and 
that may help us to qualify the general hypotheses introduced earlier. Most importantly, the 
countries vary with respect to the duration and scope of their EU membership. While France 
and Germany are among the founding members of the European Communities, the UK was in 
the first group of accession countries (joining the EC in 1973); and Austria was in the third 
group of new members entering the EU in 1995. Among the four EU member states, there are 
also differences with regard to the scope of authority transferred to the EU; most significantly, 
because the UK is not a member of the “Euro zone” and the “Schengen area”. Finally, 
Switzerland is not an EU member state but it is connected to the EU by means of Bilateral 
Treaties and EU membership was a major domestic issue in the past. 
                                                          
2 We focus on national parliamentary elections in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK. In the French 
case, we decided to analyse the first round of presidential elections, because there they are considered to be more 
important.  
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 There are various approaches for measuring issue positions and salience in party 
competition. For the topic of this article, we argue that it is most appropriate to look at 
national public debates in the mass media as they unfold during election campaigns. Media 
content reflects directly the public contestation related to European integration. It allows us to 
study systematically how the various parties compete with each other, how their competition 
resonates with the wider public, who is actually speaking as a party representative (e.g., 
executive politicians or parliamentarians), as well as which sub-issues related to European 
integration are actually debated. 
 Our content analysis rests on one national quality newspaper per country. We selected 
articles from Die Presse (Austria), The Times (Britain), Le Monde (France), Süddeutsche 
Zeitung (Germany) and Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland). From these papers, we selected 
all articles that were published within two months before the relevant national Election Day 
and report on the electoral contest and national politics more generally. We then coded the 
selected articles with the help of a core sentence analysis (CSA) (e.g., Kleinnijenhuis and 
Pennings, 2001; Kriesi et al., 2008). A more detailed description of the strategy of data 
collection and descriptive statistics can be found in the Online Appendix to this article. 
Following this type of relational content analysis, each grammatical sentence of an 
article is reduced to its most basic ‘core sentence(s)’, which contain(s) only the subject (the 
actor), the object (another object or a political issue) and the direction of the relationship 
between the two. The direction between subject and object is quantified using a scale ranging 
from -1 to +1, with three intermediary positions. CSA allows us to measure both the positions 
actors take on given issues and the salience they attribute to them. In this way we can 
determine how issue salience and actor polarization have developed over time. Thus, core 
sentences are an inductive means for capturing the full complexity of political statements 
without imposing strong theoretical expectations, such as a priori categories. 
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The three components of the concept of politicization have been operationalized as 
follows: salience is measured by the share of core sentences on European integration in per 
cent of all (potentially) coded core sentences related to any political issue. For the expansion 
of actors involved, we look at the share of non-governmental actors in per cent of all coded 
statements related to European integration. Note that this indicator is calculated on the basis 
of specific roles and functions of the actors and not on the party that the actors belong to. In 
other words, the measure indicates whether and to what extent actors in government (e.g., the 
agricultural minister or the prime minister) are joined by actors without governmental 
functions (e.g., politicians from the opposition, as well as parliamentarians or general 
secretaries from the governing parties). The indicator for polarization of party positions is 
based on Taylor and Hermann’s (1971) index, which was originally designed to measure the 
degree of left-right polarization in a party system. To study positions towards European 
integration, we identified six categories of European issues based on the work of Bartolini 
(2005, p. 310) and Kriesi et al. (2012, p. 235ff.): general orientations, widening 
(enlargement), economic deepening, non-economic deepening, economic intervention, and 
non-economic intervention (for details, see Appendix). Our measure of polarization shows 
how strongly the actors’ positions differ from one another on this set of six issues, weighting 
the issue-specific differences by the relative importance of each actor for the issue in question, 
and also weighting the relative importance of the different issues.3 Since actor positions are 
always measured on scales ranging from -1 to +1, the distance to the average (and our 
measure of polarization) can range between 0 and 1. Empirically, the three indicators are 
clearly related to each other, but the correlation is far from perfect, ranging from 0.41 
                                                          
3 With respect to the polarization dimension, the weights refer to the share of core sentences by one party in 
percent of all core sentence related to this issue, as well as to the share of one of the six European issue 
categories in percent of all core sentences related to European issues. By contrast, the measure used for the 
salience dimension refers to the share of core sentences related to all six European issues in percent of all core 
sentences relate to all kinds of political issues. 
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(salience and polarization) and 0.56 (salience and actor expansion) to 0.72 (polarization and 
actor expansion) (for details, see Online Appendix).  
In a final step, we combine the different indicators in a single politicization index. For 
the calculation of the index, the salience measure runs from 0 to 100 (per cent), whereas both 
expansion of actors and polarization are based on a scale which ranges from 0 to 1. As a 
result, the final politicization index runs from 0 to 200.  
Such an index (as well as the single indicators) immediately raises the question of how 
to interpret values. Recent controversies on the salience of European issues (e.g., de Vries 
2007 and Green-Pedersen 2012) are partly due to missing benchmarks and low thresholds. 
Since any benchmark has a crucial impact on the interpretation, we constructed an empirical 
benchmark  by using the data set of the Kriesi et al. project (2008, 2012). This data is based 
on the same coding strategy as the one employed in this article, but it covers information on 
all  issues in an election campaign, which were aggregated into twelve issue categories (e.g. 
welfare, cultural liberalism, immigration or Europe). Thus, our benchmark allows us to 
compare European integration with other issues being debated during national election 
campaigns. Apart from the decision to compare Europe with other issues, we had to decide on 
a reasonable empirical cutting point. We opted for the mean value of the politicization index 
and its three sub-dimensions as our benchmark.4 This allows us to distinguish the important 
from the less important issues in a given campaign (on average, five of the twelve issues 
covered by Kriesi et al. cross this threshold) (for more details on the calculation and 
examples, see Online Appendix). 
  
                                                          
4 In our opinion, a benchmark that takes into account only the top-issues sets the barrier too high. For 
example, this would be the case had we taken the mean plus a standard deviation as our benchmark 
(on average, only 1.5 issues cross this threshold in an election campaign). However, we discuss in the 
text when European integration issues would have also met this benchmark. 
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Empirical findings 
Tracing politicization over time and across countries 
The results of our politicization index for the individual countries and over time are highly 
instructive. They provide clear evidence that the European integration process has in fact been 
politicized. Thus, the findings support our politicization hypothesis (H 1), although with some 
major qualifications. 
To begin with, the intensification of the European integration process in the 1980s was 
accompanied by a significant increase of politicization in EU member states (as well as in 
Switzerland until the 2000s), except the UK. We calculated three yardsticks to assess general 
trends: (a) the values for individual years over time (black curve in Figure 1), (b) linear trend 
lines (fitted values in Figure 1), and (c) average values for the pre- and post-Maastricht period 
respectively (Table 1). The fitted trend lines allow observing average increases over time in 
four of the five countries. The curves for Austria, France, and Germany show more or less 
steady increases since the mid-1980s. The UK represents the opposite case. For the UK, we 
observe declining average values; politicization peaked in the UK in 1997, and subsequently 
declined below the benchmark. In Switzerland, we also observe an increase over time. 
However, the trend line is somewhat misleading since there is a sharp decline of the 
politicization index in the 2000s after the latest and decisive national referendums on the 
issue. 
[FIGURE 1] 
 
Second, in most countries politicization is a rather new phenomenon. We observe some 
politicization in the early 1970s, but its level is way below the benchmark of other political 
issues. In the three continental EU member states, the level of politicization was only above 
our benchmark in the 2000s. More specifically, European integration became a relatively 
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(although not highly) politicized issue in the Austrian elections in 2002 and 2008, the French 
election in 2007, as well as in the German elections in 2005 and 2009. The exception is the 
UK, where controversies on membership in the EC made Europe a main issue in domestic 
politics in the early 1970s; and values for the two elections in 1974 are higher than for the 
most recent ones.  
Third, we can observe a remarkable divergence across countries. In the years after 
1992, the UK and Switzerland show the highest levels of politicization; followed by France 
and Austria. In Germany, by contrast, we observe the lowest average level of politicization in 
the post-Maastricht period (see Table 1). Again, this indicates that Europe has been politicized 
by political parties in all countries at some point in the 1990s and 2000s. However, the UK 
and Switzerland differ from the three continental EU member states with regard to the overall 
level of politicization.5  
[TABLE 1] 
 
A look at the individual politicization dimensions allows differentiating this general 
picture further. The average values are presented in Table 1, whereas graphs for the individual 
dimensions can be found in the Online Appendix to this article. Values for the salience 
indicator confirm the basic trend indicated by our combined index, although with some 
interesting qualifications. Except for the UK, the salience of European integration has been 
increasing on average in all countries. As a result, Europe is now a salient issue in all five 
countries. Moreover, post-Maastricht averages are clearly above the benchmark of national 
issues. This holds even for Germany, where politicization is comparatively low. The data on 
individual indicators also allows qualifying the development in some countries. In France, in 
                                                          
5 The British election in 1997 and the Swiss election campaigns in 1991 and 1999 are the only campaigns in 
which the values of our index indicate that Europe was clearly a dominant issue. 
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contrast to the trend of the politicization index, salience peaked in the mid-1990s and declined 
subsequently. Switzerland and the UK stand out because of extremely high salience values in 
the late 1990s. Summing up, the “salience hypothesis” (H 2) is confirmed for all countries, 
although with some qualifications. 
Our indicator on the expansion of actors also confirms the politicization argument. 
Average values show an increase in all countries (with some qualifications for the UK and 
Switzerland) (see Table 1). This trend started in the 1980s, reflecting transfers of authority by 
the Single European Act and the establishment of a Single European Market. As expected, we 
find a stronger participation of non-governmental actors in the UK as early as the 1970s. If we 
take a look at pre-and post-Maastricht averages, the UK and Switzerland stand out because of 
their high values for the post-1992 period, which come close to the benchmark. In 
comparison, post-1992 values for Austria, France and Germany are significantly lower. 
However, we observe a strong increase in the post-Maastricht period in these countries; and in 
the late 2000s, values for the participation of non-governmental partisan actors hit the 
benchmark. Summing up, the “actor expansion hypothesis” (H 3) can be confirmed. 
Finally, our polarization index shows that the politicization of Europe is accompanied 
by an increase in polarization on European issues in all countries. Except for the UK, where 
the 1970s were characterized by a strong polarization of the two major parties on issues of EC 
membership, the level of polarization was very low in that decade. Until the mid-1980s, we 
find clear evidence for the existence of an “elite consensus” among the major political parties. 
Post-1992 averages show that the intensification of the European integration process has 
produced an increasing polarization in each of our four EU member states (again, see Table 
1). A look at individual countries reveals a very disparate picture, however. In France, 
polarization started in the 1980s; in Austria, it was a consequence of domestic controversies 
on the country’s EU accession; in Switzerland, it was the result of fierce conflicts on EU 
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membership; in Germany, polarization was limited to the debate on Turkey’s EU membership 
in the mid-2000s; and in the UK, we observe a sharp increase in polarization since the mid-
2000s. Summing up, the “polarization hypothesis” (H 4) can be confirmed, although with 
major qualifications. 
Taken together, our empirical analysis confirms most of our theoretical expectations. 
We not only find support for the general politicization hypothesis, but also for the hypotheses 
on individual dimensions. At the same time, the individual indicators provide additional 
insights into the structure of politicization, its timing and on country-specific variations. A 
comparison of individual indicators and our combined index confirms that the index should 
not be replaced by any individual indicator. Moreover, it apparently synthesizes the various 
indicators in a meaningful way, i.e., it reproduces the general pattern, which becomes visible 
when analysing each of these indicators separately; and at the same time it sensibly corrects 
for their idiosyncrasies. 
 
Driving forces of change: critical events, radical right-wing parties, and cultural-identitarian 
frames 
Having assessed the development of politicization of European integration, we now test our 
hypotheses on the driving forces of this process. We start with an analysis of critical events. 
At first sight, the general trend of politicization seems to confirm our authority transfer 
hypothesis. Except for the UK, the increase of politicization is more or less in line with the 
intensification of the transfer of political authority, which started in the mid-1980s and peaked 
in the 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent treaty reforms. A comparison of 
average values for the pre- and post-Maastricht period reveals an increase of politicization in 
every country (see Table 1). The increase in politicization was not only a product of the 
Maastricht Treaty, however. Contrary to the expectations of the “political authority 
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hypothesis”, the Maastricht Treaty was neither the starting point of politicization, nor its first 
peak. In three of the four EU member states, the politicization of the European integration 
process is a phenomenon of the 2000s rather than of the 1990s. In these countries, 
politicization peaked in the mid-2000s as the combined result of Eastern Enlargement, debates 
on the Constitutional Treaty, and of controversies surrounding Turkey’s EU membership. 
Since we observed remarkable cross-national variation, we went one step further and 
analysed the major events and issues that triggered the highest levels of politicization. For this 
purpose, we focused on the fourteen elections for which we observed a politicization index 
above the benchmark: Six of these elections were observed for the United Kingdom (02/1974, 
10/1974, 1983, 1992, 1997, 2001), three for Switzerland (1991, 1995, 1999), two for Austria 
(2002, 2008) and Germany (2005, 2009), and one for France (2007) (again, see Figure 1). We 
find that six of these fourteen elections are more or less directly related to transfers of 
authority, the Maastricht Treaty and the Constitutional process in particular. These are the 
British campaigns in 1992, 1997, and 2001, in which the Maastricht Treaty and its main 
provisions, such as the Economic and Monetary Union and the Social Protocol, were highly 
controversial issues. The other three cases (i.e., France 2007, Austria 2008, and Germany 
2009) were related to the failed Constitutional process and the subsequent debate over the 
Lisbon Treaty. But note that especially the polarization in the French 2007 and Austrian 2008 
campaigns were also boosted by conflicts over Turkey’s EU membership. The importance of 
membership conflicts becomes fully apparent in the other politicized elections. In the two UK 
elections in 1974, it was domestic conflicts on British EC membership; in the Swiss elections 
in the 1990s, Swiss membership of the EU and the country’s Bilateral Treaties with the EU 
were the key issues in the campaigns. In Germany in 2005, the relatively high politicization of 
Europe was mostly due to conflicts over Turkey’s EU membership. The Austrian election in 
2002 does not represent a “post-Maastricht” effect either. In this case, high politicization 
resulted from debates about both Eastern enlargement and dissatisfaction with the EU caused 
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by the sanctions imposed on the country as a response to the inclusion of the radical right FPÖ 
in government in 2000.   
In sum, our findings suggest a major qualification of the authority transfer hypothesis 
(H 5). The highest levels of politicization in the national electoral arena are not produced by 
the accumulated effects of authority transfers; rather they result from conflicts on 
membership. As we can see in the British case, these conflicts are not settled with a country’s 
accession to the EU, they can be resuscitated at later stages of the integration process. 
Moreover, as the controversies on Turkey’s EU membership in the mid-2000s demonstrate, 
membership conflicts can also be triggered by another country seeking membership in the 
EU. In this case, it is not national sovereignty in the first place, but national and European 
identity which is the cause of controversies. 
Critical events alone do not produce politicization, they need actors who articulate and 
mobilize political conflicts. To see whether the presence of strong radical right-wing 
challengers boosts politicization, as suggested by our “radical right hypothesis” (H 6), we 
plotted their vote share against our politicization index.6 As shown in graph 1 in Figure 2, our 
results do not indicate that the presence of strong populist radical challengers from the right 
necessarily increases the politicization of European integration. We find no strong linear 
effect between the vote share of populist radical right parties and the degree of politicization. 
This is in line with other research indicating that, in contrast to immigration issues, European 
integration has only been a salient issue for some of the populist radical right-wing parties 
(e.g., Bornschier, 2010; Ivarsflaten, 2008).  
[FIGURE 2] 
 
                                                          
6 The vote share of radical right parties is taken as a proxy for their overall strength in the national party system.  
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Rather than attributing the politicization of European integration exclusively to new 
radical challengers, our data suggest that there are two different political mechanisms at work, 
which are based on different actor constellations. The first constellation is the one assumed by 
the “radical right hypothesis”, i.e., a strong populist radical party mobilizes on European 
issues by advocating Eurosceptic positions. The politicized elections in Austria, Switzerland, 
and France are cases in point. However, our findings reveal a second actor constellation that 
contradicts the “radical right hypothesis”. Politicization of Europe in national elections can 
also be high if major mainstream parties in the party system disagree with each other on the 
issue, and not just when major parties are opposed by fringe parties. This happened in the UK 
in the 1970s and the 1990s, where Europe became a main object of inter-party competition 
between the Conservatives and Labour. The German elections in 2005 and 2009 provide 
additional evidence in support of this second mechanism. 
Finally, we examined whether politicization is driven by economic or cultural-
identitarian political framing strategies. The results can be found in the second graph in Figure 
2, which plots the share of cultural frames in per cent of all frames against the politicization 
index. Our results show a positive correlation (r=0.45) between the share of cultural framing 
strategies and the degree of politicization. In thirteen out of the fourteen campaigns in which 
Europe was relatively politicized, we observe an above-average share of cultural frames used 
by the parties to justify their positions towards European integration. This finding clearly 
supports the “cultural shift hypothesis” (H 7). While different actor constellations may be 
responsible for the politicization of Europe, the importance of cultural and identity-related 
justifications seems to play a role in both. 
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Conclusions 
The results of our empirical analysis provide strong evidence that European integration has in 
fact been politicized, as argued in the scholarly literature (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Statham 
and Trenz, 2012, 2013; de Wilde and Zürn, 2012). Our main politicization hypothesis (H 1), 
and subsequent hypotheses on salience (H 2), expansion of actors (H3), and polarization (H4), 
are all supported, although with some qualifications. These results are particularly important 
for the current debate on the politicization of Europe, because we were able to observe this 
process systematically over a long period of time, in the most relevant political arena, and 
with a differentiated multi-dimensional concept. Moreover, we assessed the visibility, scope 
and intensity of this process with the help of an empirical benchmark related to domestic 
issues in national elections.  
As a result, we get a nuanced picture of the politicization of Europe in the electoral 
arena. We found remarkable differences in the level, timing and patterns of politicization 
across countries which reflect different national histories with regard to European integration, 
and different positions in the integration process. This holds in particular for the UK and 
Switzerland, where EU membership was, for decades, a major issue of domestic political 
conflict and polarization. In these countries, European issues are fully integrated into the 
agenda of domestic politics, and in times when Europe is on the national political agenda, we 
observe very high levels of politicization. The three continental European EU member states 
are clearly distinct. In these countries, Europe has become a salient issue in the last two 
decades, too; however, politicization is significantly lower. These results are clear proof that it 
is necessary to differentiate between salience and politicization. While Europe has become a 
salient issue in all five countries, it has become highly politicized only in the UK and 
Switzerland in national elections. In France and Germany, but also in Austria, the degree of 
politicization was much lower on average. Moreover, politicization has developed differently 
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in the five countries under observation. While it has been increasing steadily in Austria, 
France and Germany in the 2000s, it sharply declined in the UK and Switzerland. This 
certainly indicates that, in all countries, political parties are no longer as reluctant to wake up 
the “sleeping giant” of European integration. 
Our analysis of the driving forces of this politicization process provide mixed results for 
the hypotheses advanced in the scholarly literature. On average, politicization is higher in the 
post-Maastricht period, which supports the “authority transfer hypothesis” (H 5). However, it 
is only in the UK where we observe a clear-cut “Maastricht” effect in the 1990s. In the other 
countries, politicization in the last two decades has been linked rather to other events, such as 
the membership debates in Switzerland and Austria, or the controversies over Turkey’s EU 
membership in France and Germany. Moreover, it seems as if the importance of new 
challengers, of populist radical right parties in particular, for the politicization of Europe has 
been overestimated in the literature (see Kriesi 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kriesi et al. 
2008, 2012). In our data, the “radical right hypothesis” (H 6) finds only partial support. There 
is evidence for it in Switzerland (and to some extent, in Austria and France); however, we 
also observed very high levels of politicization if there is a conflict between major 
mainstream parties on European issues (see Green-Pedersen 2012). In both constellations, 
politicization is most likely if conflicts on European integration are framed in cultural terms 
by political parties. Thus, the “cultural shift hypothesis” (H 7) is supported.  
In sum, our analysis suggests that there are two different political paths towards a 
politicization of Europe. One of these paths is dominated by populist radical parties from the 
right, while the other path is shaped by the conflict between mainstream parties in government 
and opposition. On both paths, membership conflicts play an important role and cultural-
identitarian framing strategies are used. However, the two paths might nevertheless lead to 
quite different ends. The first path, dominated by Eurosceptic radical parties from the right, 
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most likely leads to ever tighter constraints on formal transfers of political authority to the EU 
and the inclusion of new member states. The political consequences of the second path are 
less clear. They may be both positive and negative, and the definitive outcome may depend on 
empirically contingent political actor constellations, actor strategies and the strength of 
political coalitions. For this reason, it would be important to examine these two paths in more 
detail in future research to better understand the political mechanisms that influence the 
politicization of European integration and its consequences. With respect to the causes and 
consequences of politicization, this article has made only a start for further in-depth studies, 
which, amongst others, should not look just at party contestation in the electoral arena but 
take into account the conflicts over European integration  among different types of political 
actors and across various political arenas. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Politicization index by year and country 
 
Notes: The figure shows the value of the politicization index by election. The dashed line 
shows the linear trend, while the black horizontal line at 6.24 indicates the benchmark for the 
politicization index. The black vertical line marks the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty. 
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Table 1: Average values for all years and post-Maastricht by country 
 Politicization index Salience Expansion of actors Polarization Number of cases 
 Range 
0 to 200 
Share of CS 
(%) 
Share of non-exec. actors 
(%) 
Range 
0 to 1 
CS /elections 
 Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
All 
years 
Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
All 
years 
Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
All 
years 
Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
All 
years 
 
UK  7.8 8.6 8.1 11.5 11.1 11.3 49.9 59.9 54.3 0.14 0.23 0.18 3,988 /9 
Switzerland 3.0 9.1 5.4 4.6 9.0 6.4 38.2 59.4 46.7 0.05 0.23 0.12 1,973 /10 
France 2.0 6.6 4.3 6.8 9.8 8.3 19.8 51.8 35.8 0.09 0.17 0.12 2,476 /6 
Austria 0.6 6.2 3.2 3.3 10.4 6.4 22.7 47.7 34.3 0.00 0.12 0.06 2,872 /13 
Germany 1.0 5.2 2.9 4.7 8.4 6.4 21.4 47.1 33.1 0.02 0.12 0.06 3,370 /11 
Benchmark 6.2 8.2 60.0 0.13  
Notes: The values indicate averages per election campaign. Bold numbers indicate values above the benchmark. CS=core sentence 
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Figure 2: Driven by populist radical parties from the right or by cultural framing strategies? 
 
Notes: The horizontal solid line shows the average based on the benchmark data (6.24), and the vertical solid line the average vote share of 
populist radical right parties in the elections covered by the present dataset, and the average of cultural frames used to justify positions towards 
European integration (in percent of all frames coded). In this calculation, we did not consider the Austrian FPÖ before 1986 and the Swiss SVP 
before 1990 as populist radical right parties. However, this does not change the findings significantly. 
